Held · Bookmarked
0 · 0
portfolios · users
Avg position size
—
of holders' portfolios
13F filers
5
institutions
Market cap
$85.3B
2,232M shares
52-week range
$37.37 – $49.57
6% from low
Exchange
NYSE
CS
P/S (TTM)
1.2
Brookfield Corp is an investment firm focused on building long-term wealth for institutions and individuals, operating through seven segments: Asset Management, Wealth Solutions, Renewable Power and Transition, Infrastructure, Private Equity (which generates the highest revenue), Real Estate, and Corporate Activities. The company invests in real assets that form the backbone of the economy to deliver risk-adjusted returns to stakeholders, with the majority of its revenue coming from Asset Management. It has a presence across the United Kingdom, the United States (which contributes the highest revenue), Australia, Canada, Brazil, India, Colombia, Germany, other parts of Europe, other parts of Asia, and additional countries.
www.brookfield.comNo one on the platform currently holds BN.
| Institution | Shares | Reported |
|---|---|---|
| Pershing Square Capitalas of 2026-03-31 | 59,697,208 | $2.4B |
| The Baupost Groupas of 2026-03-31 | 11,208,969 | $453.6M |
| Ex-date | Per share | Pay date |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-14 | $0.0700 | 2026-09-29 |
| 2026-06-15 | $0.0700 | 2026-06-30 |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.0700 | 2026-03-31 |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.0600 | 2025-12-31 |
| 2025-09-12 | $0.0900 | 2025-09-29 |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.0900 | 2025-06-30 |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.0900 | 2025-03-31 |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.0800 | 2024-12-31 |
| 2024-09-12 | $0.0800 | 2024-09-27 |
| 2024-06-13 | $0.0800 | 2024-06-28 |
No one on the platform has traded BN yet.
Consensus-seeded revenue, margins, and exit multiples. This is a scenario tool, not investment advice.
Consensus does not cover every selected forecast year. Later assumptions are extrapolated from available analyst estimates.
| Metric | Historical average | My assumptions | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 year | 5 years | 10 years | Low | Mid | High | |
| ROIC % | 3.4% | 3.2% | 3.7% | — | — | — |
| Rev. Growth % | -11.5% | 3.9% | ||||
| Profit Margin % | 1.7% | 2.2% | 3.2% | |||
| Free Cash Flow Margin % | 0.0% | -0.6% | 2.7% | |||
| Exit P/E | — | — | — | |||
| Exit P/FCF | — | — | — | |||
| Desired Annual Return % | — | — | — | |||
At today's price, your expected annual return is -20.9% on the P/E track.
At today's price, your expected annual return is -17.2% on the P/E track.
At today's price, your expected annual return is -14.0% on the P/E track.
| 6,200,000 |
| $284.5M |
| Bridgewater Associatesas of 2026-03-31 | 477,453 | $19.3M |
| Renaissance Technologiesas of 2025-06-30 | 47,363 | $2.9M |
| 2024-03-12 | $0.0800 | 2024-03-28 |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.0700 | 2023-12-29 |
| Execution date | Ratio |
|---|---|
| 2025-10-10 | 3-for-2 |
| 2020-04-02 | 1.5-for-1 |
| 2015-05-13 | 3-for-2 |
| 2007-06-04 | 3-for-2 |
| 2006-04-28 | 1.5-for-1 |
| Year | Est. revenue | Growth | Est. EPS | EPS range | Fwd P/E | # Analysts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | $7.6B | -7.5% | $2.77 | $2.66–$2.91 | 13.7× | 1 |
| 2027 | $9.4B | +23.6% | $3.41 | $3.25–$3.67 | 11.2× | 1 |
| 2028 | $11.4B | +22.3% | $3.82 | $3.80–$3.84 | 10.0× | 1 |
Forward consensus · growth is YoY vs the prior fiscal-year estimate · Fwd P/E at the current price · source: Financial Modeling Prep
Beat consensus in 6 of the last 8 reported quarters
| Reported | Est. EPS | Actual | Surprise |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 | $0.62 | $0.60 | -2.9% |
| 2026-05-14 | $0.60 | $0.58 | -3.3% |
| 2026-02-12 | $0.61 | $0.67 | +9.8% |
| 2025-11-13 | $0.59 | $0.63 | +6.2% |
| 2025-08-07 | $0.59 | $0.88 | +48.4% |
| 2025-05-08 | $0.59 | $0.65 | +10.2% |
| 2025-02-13 | $0.57 | $0.67 | +17.5% |
| 2024-11-14 | $0.53 | $0.56 | +5.7% |
| $74.5B |
| — |
| BENFranklin Resources, Inc. | $33.47 | -0.53% | $17.4B | — |
| BLKBlackRock, Inc. | $1065.60 | -1.30% | $165.2B | — |
Source: Financial Modeling Prep · peers by sector/industry
$BN Excellent article that nails exactly where BN stands right now. So if you want to update your BN knowledge or get acquainted with BN, this is a must read. https://everyticker.com/quote/BN/analysis/brookfield-s-insurance-metamorphosis-how-180b-of-float-and-ai-infrastructure-arbitrage-create-a-structural-inflection-point-nyse-bn
View on StockTwits ↗
$BN the slides both BN and BAM are taking is unwarranted and is a good buying opportunity!
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Portfolio update — September 13, 2026 YTD Performance: +29.86% Positions: 11 My only purchase this week was $BN at $38.71. Other: $BN 4.5% $NFLX 3.7% $FUBO 0.7% Still prioritizing cash and waiting for better opportunities before getting more aggressive.
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Portfolio update — September 6, 2026 YTD Performance: +30.71% Positions: 11 This week’s only buy was $BN at $39.93. Other: $BN 4.5% $NFLX 3.7% $FUBO 0.7% Still focused on rebuilding cash and being selective with new buys.
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$GPRO $BN You're keeping on chasing the nonsense, buddy. You’re modeling NewCo as if it’s GoPro 2.0, which is simply wrong. GoPro’s operating losses don’t define the valuation because the legacy consumer business isn’t the basis of NewCo’s economics. Starman is acquiring GoPro for its 2,500+ optics patents, sensor IP, imaging pipelines, ruggedized tech, and Nasdaq shell. All of which are strategic assets for defense, robotics, aerospace, and national‑security markets. Defense pivots are valued on IP, positioning, and contract potential, not on legacy run‑rate losses. Your “$240M break‑even” math assumes the old GoPro business continues unchanged, which the merger doesn't create. You’re applying consumer‑electronics accounting to a defense‑optics pivot. That’s why your conclusion is off.
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$GPRO is Starman worth × amount $bn? how quickly Starman becomes profitable, and by how much, while NewCo inherits GoPro's existing operating losses. The ~$92m debt payoff at closing doesn't solve this — operating loss is an operating problem, not a debt problem. GoPro lost $96.2m at the operating level in H1 2026, roughly $192m annualised on a simple run-rate basis. Illustratively, if Aperion's 20% profit share applied to the relevant Starman profit base, Starman would need around $240m of pre-Aperion profit to contribute ~$192m after that share — merely enough to offset that GoPro operating-loss run rate. That's before Starman's factory ramp, capex and other NewCo costs. GoPro can obviously cut costs, so I'm not claiming $240m is a literal break-even forecast. The point is that the proxy needs to show the bridge from today's economics to the valuation the market is already assigning.
View on StockTwits ↗$BN under $40 is a steal to me. You’re getting one of the best capital allocators in the world with massive exposure to infrastructure, power, data centers and the buildout behind AI. I’ve been buying $BN consistently, and at these levels I’m more than happy to keep adding.
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Recent $TICKER stream from stocktwits.com — refreshed every 5 minutes. Sentiment tags are self-reported by posters. Not investment advice.
Click to see transaction details on SEC.gov. Form 4s cover trades by officers, directors, and 10%+ owners, due within 2 business days of the trade.